Eighteen-year old Loyola student Sheridan Gorman, gunned down by an illegal in Chicago.
Fairfax County, Virginia woman Stephanie Minter, randomly stabbed to death by an illegal with 30 priors.
An NYC trans illegal from Colombia who gets a six-month plea deal for raping a 14-year old boy.
Laken Riley, Rachel Morin, Jocelyn Nungary… we could go on.
It has to stop. So this week, we focus on the problem that helped get Donald Trump re-elected, and which is still very much with us: the 10-to-20 million unvetted illegals the Biden administration visited upon this nation.
We start with Chris, who puts the lie to one of the Dems’ default talking points — then move on to some potential fixes.
One thing is clear: the left remains married to Defund 2.0. That is, “ICE Out.”
It’s not where the country is, however. It’s time for the Trump administration to go on offense.
Do Illegals ACTUALLY Commit Less Crime?
After the tragic killing of Loyola University Chicago student Sheridan Gorman last week, we saw news outlets that support open borders spouting the same old mantra, “immigrants commit less crime than native born Americans.” We keep hearing that, but news reports (and the Trump Administration) seem to indicate otherwise. What is the truth?
I will start by saying that I am pro-immigration. Not illegal immigration, but it should be easier to legally immigrate here for people who want to come and contribute to this great country. I also believe that if you commit a crime, you’re gone.
As far as illegal immigrant crime, the studies that show illegal immigrants commit less crime are often deeply flawed. This is not uncommon in sociology studies. Sociology is not an exact science. It is not math. There are so many variables and unknowns that accuracy is often impossible.
And those that conduct these studies often seem to have an agenda. Then the media cherry-picks studies that affirm their priorities, so an accurate picture is hard to discern.
Most studies show that illegals commit less overall crime than native born Americans, but that they may commit higher rates of homicide. This is important, because homicides are almost always reported, and therefore may give a more accurate representation.
Some of the more widely cited studies also appear to have issues with the data that may skew results; let’s look at two.
This Is “Proof”?
An oft-cited study is the one done by three professors from the University of Wisconsin – Madison (an uber-liberal hotbed) that shows lower rates among illegals (they use the term “undocumented,” so you know what the outcome will be before you read it).
This study uses data from the Texas Department of Public Safety. It measures mostly felony arrests of illegal immigrants against citizens between 2012 and 2018, before the surge in illegal immigration under Biden. It also only counts immigrants in the state of Texas, which certainly skews the results if you apply its conclusions to the entire nation.
One would think such a flaw would be obvious to the examiners. One would be wrong.
Another oft-quoted study was conducted by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). This study only compares convictions (not arrests) between 1870 and 2019. To compare illegal immigration crime in the past five years to 2019 is like comparing the speed of international travel before the invention of the airplane to today.
This study is also flawed because it uses different data sets for different periods in history, due to the availability of information. How anyone could expect a data set from the 1870’s to comport with today’s metrics remains a mystery.
There are other problems with these and other studies. Many of them are based on conviction rates rather than arrest rates. This is an inherent problem. Illegal immigrants are, by definition, migratory. After making bail, many will flee the jurisdiction, either to another location within the United States or back to their country of origin. Any cop will tell you: the disparity between arrest numbers and conviction numbers is a canyon.
I could not find any studies that examines this aspect of the issue. And another issue in these cases: the complainants are often immigrants themselves. Meaning many will be less likely to see a case through to conviction due to fear of their own immigration issues or because of their own migratory nature.
Yet another obvious flaw: Illegal immigrants tend to live in jurisdictions that do not ask about immigration status. Places like New York City and Los Angeles often have no idea if a criminal is here legally or not. Even in Texas, whether a convict is an illegal immigrant is not always known. Limiting studies to only a few locations that gather that data cannot possibly give an accurate picture of illegal immigrant crime nationwide.
And perhaps most significantly: current studies do not extend into the Biden Administration, when we saw Venezuela empty its prisons and send criminals north to the United States. Under Biden, the crime rate in Venezuela dropped like a rock. So past data likely does not represent the current reality. Studies like the NBER one that examine immigrant crime since 1870 are essentially irrelevant to the current environment.
The Biggest Flaw
In the end, likely the most significant weakness in these immigrant crime surveys is that they must estimate the total number of undocumented immigrants in the population. Put simply: no one knows how many there are. You cannot get an accurate percentage if you are guessing what the denominator is. That is basic math.
So when media outlets say with certainty that illegal immigrants commit less crime than American citizens as an absolute fact, they are lying – or uninformed. Limited and flawed surveys are not substitutes for dispositive scientific results.
Do The “Rates” Actually Matter?
Americans can argue about what the truth is in illegal immigrant crime, but one thing is certain. We can do a much better job of curtailing crime in the illegal population, whatever their rate of offending is. Sheridan Gorman’s killer was Jose Medina, an illegal immigrant from Venezuela. He is the poster boy for this debate.
He had a prior arrest history in Chicago and had not shown up for court but was never deported. He entered the United States in 2023 under Biden’s open border policy. He had come to the United States after living in Colombia. He had reportedly been shot in the head in Colombia and suffered brain damage from the injury. As any cop will tell you, people who get shot are likely to also be involved in criminality, but at this time there’s no confirmation that he was involved in crime while living in Columbia. As with most immigrants, his prior criminal history is completely unknown.
He had also tested positive for tuberculosis while here in the United States, another “benefit” of unvetted immigration. Unusually, he had also requested to be sent back to Colombia, but for unknown reasons, his request was not complied with.
So, to review: We have an unvetted, brain-damaged criminal suffering from tuberculosis who requested deportation wandering the streets of Chicago with a gun.
As President Trump said, “they’re not sending the best… they’re sending people that have lots of problems.” In many cases, he is correct. Americans have heard this story too many times before. Sheridan Gorman’s parents are outraged. All Americans should be.
An Operational Fix: The Task Force Model
Among the best operational ideas ever devised in law enforcement is the U.S. “joint task force” approach. Unlike some other nations, because America’s states enjoy a level of sovereignty, federal and state/local law enforcement don’t always intersect as they should.
Enter the “joint task force” model. The idea has been around awhile, relative to organized crime — it was, in fact, a key aspect of eroding the national power of the “Five Families.” But where the notion truly came into its own was regarding terrorism.
Even before 9/11, the U.S. had begun implementing Joint Terrorism Task Forces in cities nationwide. Today, there are over 100 of them.
So if it worked for the mafia, and it worked for terrorism….
As we did nearly two years ago, we propose now something called “JAM” teams — Joint Anti-Migrant Crime Task Forces. Just as with previous task force iterations, these teams would be comprised of the alphabet soup of federal agencies — FBI, ICE, CBP, ATF, DEA, etc. — as well as state and local cops.
The construct is a tremendous force multiplier. Teams that have federal reach, together with the in-the-weeds, localized knowledge that cops alone often have.
The locals, too, often have the requisite language skills. Certainly, there is hardly a language out there not represented within NYPD’s ranks.
Another benefit? It’s a way around the idiotic “sanctuary city” designation. Because the local cops are “federalized” by joining the task force, they operate as federal agents. This not only allows them access to federal intel — it allows them to share their own intel. Even the NYC statute designating New York as a sanctuary city has a carve-out for NYPD task force members.
And if sanctuary jurisdictions won’t cooperate? Then good luck to you — federal agents and money will not be riding to your rescue (see our Legal Editor article, below). Which will also put significant pressure on local politicians to get in the game as the feds make big, public cases — without the locals.
With the simple standing-up of a model that’s been used for decades, Donald Trump could sidestep numerous time-consuming battles with local “sanctuary” cities.
This concept also opens a “referral” mechanism for law enforcement. Encounter an illegal committing a crime? No need to get embroiled in whatever the policy-of-the-day is; just refer the case to the JAM team. They come, pick up your perp, and you’re done (this is how many specialized units in law enforcement actually receive their best cases).
Proof-of-concept for such an approach was provided in 2017, when Donald Trump visited Long Island, NY to support a task force constituted against MS-13 — with historic results. The task force made major cases, and 13 was badly damaged.
The task force model is the best way to go at a widespread, entrenched problem. Announce it, stand it up, train for it, resource it — and let it roll.
Will it stop dead the roll call of Sheridan Gormans, Laken Rileys, Rachel Morins, and Jocelyn Nungarys? No.
But it’s our best shot, after what the Biden administration did to us. And the Dems continue to do.
From The Legal Desk: More Leverage, If Trump Will Use It
Is there anything that can be done legally about sanctuary cities? Maybe.
At its core, the problem is simple: states and localities refuse to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement. They decline to honor non-judicial detainers and refuse to notify federal authorities when an illegal alien is about to be released from custody. These are political decisions forced upon local law enforcement - a direction not to cooperate. But the reason it persists is not just political; this local political power is actually grounded in the Constitution. But there may still be a path to restored order.
The Supreme Court has made clear that immigration enforcement is almost exclusively a federal responsibility. But under the Tenth Amendment, the Court has also made clear that Washington cannot force states to help carry out that enforcement. To do so would allow the federal government to conscript state governments into administering federal law - something fundamentally at odds with the system of dual sovereignty our Constitution was designed to protect. This principle is known as the “anti-commandeering” doctrine.
The Supreme Court has applied this doctrine to prevent the federal government from requiring states to administer or enforce federal regulatory programs in areas such as gun control and online gambling, and likely applies to sanctuary policies, though the Supreme Court has not yet ruled directly on that question.
But that is not quite the end of the story. If Washington cannot command the states, what can it do? Leverage.
The federal government distributes billions each year to state and local law enforcement through multiple funding streams, grants tied to policing, crime prevention, and public safety. Under the Constitution’s Spending Clause, it can attach conditions to that funding, so long as those conditions are related to the purpose of the funds, authorized by statute, and not so coercive that they amount to a federal takeover (in other words, commandeering). This path has already been tested, but the Supreme Court never got to decide the issue.
During his first term, President Trump tried this approach and conditioned funding under the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program on cooperation with federal immigration enforcement. This was a big hit to many blue-state budgets. Sanctuary jurisdictions immediately sued, and the circuit courts split. Several circuits ruled against the policy, but importantly, the Second Circuit (New York, Connecticut, Vermont) upheld it.
The Supreme Court never resolved the national split because before the issue could reach the Court, the Biden administration took power and reversed course. The issue left the Court’s docket, but the underlying conflict remains.
And that leaves room for President Trump to push this forward.
The President should reinstate the conditions, force the litigation, and get the case to the Supreme Court. The Court has recently shown a willingness to act through what is often referred to as the “shadow docket,” effectively expediting important decisions. It is not unreasonable to think the Court would choose to take up a case addressing this issue.
Now, this path is hardly a guarantee. The line between lawful conditions and improper coercion, that is, commandeering, is hazy at best. But this is exactly the kind of conflict the Supreme Court exists to decide.
There is also another very real consideration. The ultimate goal of withholding the federal funds would be to get sanctuary jurisdictions to start acting rationally again, in the interest of public safety. But that is where this becomes a double-edged sword.
The leverage comes from the threat to pull law enforcement funding (and there are more federal funding streams than the Edward Byrnes funding). Sanctuary jurisdictions (i.e. blue cities and states) are already under financial strain as high-income taxpayers leave, and perhaps that threat would be enough to force change.
On the other hand, actually pulling that funding risks weakening the very crime-fighting capacity the maneuver is meant to strengthen. Crime in these areas could actually increase, hurting innocent residents and risking political blowback for the Trump administration. That tension is real. And it may be unavoidable.
But taking a shot at the Supreme Court at this point feels worth it. With no realistic prospect of a legislative fix, and no indication that political reason will return to blue-state Democrats in the age of Trump, the alternatives are few. At some point, something has to be done to restore rationality.
AMERICA’S MAYORS — PART OF THE PROBLEM
Hartford Police Officer Joseph Magnano was fired Friday by Mayor Arunan Arulampalam. The rookie officer, still on probation, was terminated for shooting Steven Jones, who was armed at the time. On February 27th, Magnano and other officers responded to an emotionally disturbed man on the street with a knife. Magnano shot and killed the man as he advanced toward him. The mayor didn’t like the optics, so he fired the officer under his probationary status.
As the first officer arrived, Steven Jones exited his house with a large knife and moved into the street as the encounter developed. The Connecticut Attorney General released body camera footage from each officer on scene, allowing public review of the interaction and shooting:
As with many critical incidents, officers began by keeping a safe distance. As the situation progressed, they deployed tasers, but the tactic was ineffective—the prongs failed to make the connection needed to complete the circuit.
As the situation unfolded, officers closed the distance with Jones to within about three feet at one point. That’s not uncommon as tension rises, but it is extremely dangerous. That gap can be closed before a trigger is pulled. In the NYPD, we trained to maintain 21 feet from anyone with an edged weapon—outside the effective range of most tasers.
During the confrontation, officers repeatedly tried to communicate. They asked, pleaded, ordered, and begged him to drop the knife. He never appeared to engage. Perhaps they could have asked what was wrong or why he had the knife, but Jones seemed completely unresponsive, making it unlikely that would have changed the outcome.
Officers are seen with guns drawn throughout; deadly force was justified through most of the confrontation. Every officer knew it, and they were willing to risk themselves to bring the standoff to a peaceful conclusion.
Officer Magnano arrived late. His fresh perspective revealed a dangerous scene—officers too close, traffic still passing, civilians nearby. Jones focused on Magnano and moved quickly toward him and bystanders, still armed. Jones was about six feet from a bystander and nine feet from Magnano when the decision to shoot was made. Magnano likely relied on recent training and made a tough call. It was the right one in that moment, however tragic. Jones was clearly ill, but also a deadly threat.
In incidents like this, officers should use every resource to find a peaceful resolution. But to many, de-escalation is treated as a cure-all. It isn’t. Some situations cannot be resolved with words.
Could things have been handled differently? Perhaps. But just as easily, officers or civilians could have been killed. Hindsight is 20/20, but in Mayor Arulampalam’s view, firing an officer who followed training was the easiest path forward—likely with an eye toward the next election.
Another term for it could be: politics. Or maybe: cowardice.
Joseph Magnano now must deal with the trauma of taking a life while trying to rebuild his life and career. Cops are expendable in today’s society—good luck and good riddance is the message to Magnano and others in similar situations.
Can anyone doubt that Zohran Mamdani, Brandon Johnson, or Karen Bass would do the same?
And they wonder why there’s a recruitment and retention problem in this country. Ask Joseph Mangano. He can offer a few insights.
OPS DESK BRIEF: THE HOUTHIS
Suddenly, we hear a lot about the threat imposed by a new group entering the Iran equation. Is it genuine?
The Houthis—formally Ansar Allah—are a Yemen-based militant movement backed by Iran. What started as a localized insurgency has matured into something far more consequential: an Iranian proxy with the ability to reach into global commerce.
And they matter now because of where they sit and when they’re acting.
The Houthis control territory along the Red Sea corridor, including positions near the Bab al-Mandab Strait—the southern gateway to one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes. Layer that onto Iranian pressure in the nearby Strait of Hormuz, and the picture sharpens: two chokepoints along major arteries into the Mideast, with Iran squeezing from the north and the Houthis pressing from the south. Between them runs a substantial portion of the world’s energy and trade.
That risk has already moved from theory to practice. The Houthis have shown they can launch anti-ship missiles, drones, and long-range strikes, forcing commercial vessels to reroute and pulling U.S. and allied forces into repeated defensive and retaliatory operations. Recent reporting underscores how they’ve tied their actions directly to the broader confrontation involving Iran, positioning themselves as an extension of Tehran (see, for example, Reuters coverage of Houthi escalation, Washington Post report on Houthi attacks, and the Guardian’s live updates on Houthi operations.
Now, none of this is happening in a vacuum. The Houthis have been on the receiving end of sustained military pressure for years. A Saudi-led coalition spent much of the last decade conducting extensive air campaigns against their positions, leadership, and infrastructure.
More recently, U.S. and allied forces have carried out targeted strikes on missile launchers, radar systems, and drone capabilities in response to attacks on shipping. Naval forces have repeatedly intercepted Iranian weapons shipments bound for Houthi control, and precision strikes have sought to disrupt their mobile launch platforms before they can be used.
Those efforts have had an effect—but not the one policymakers might prefer. The Houthis have been degraded, not dismantled. They’ve adapted, dispersing their assets, relying on mobile systems, and leveraging Yemen’s rugged terrain to absorb and outlast air power.
Just as important, they are no longer simply a militia; they are an entrenched governing force over large swaths of territory, with a steady external lifeline from Iran.
That reality shapes what comes next. Eliminating the Houthis outright would likely require a ground campaign of significant scale or a political fracture within their ranks—neither of which appears imminent. What remains is a more familiar strategy: contain, disrupt, and raise the cost. Continued strikes can limit their capabilities. Seaborne ops can blunt their impact. Interdictions can slow the flow of weapons. None of it is decisive, but sustained pressure can make them all-but irrelevant — emphasis on sustained. Will U.S. assets and allies commit to that?
The bottom line is this: the Houthis are a durable, capable proxy that can create real friction in global shipping and pose a persistent threat to the interests of the U.S. and our allies. But they are not in a position to shut down the world’s energy arteries on their own or fundamentally reshape the regional balance. Their power lies in disruption, not domination—and in our current volatile moment, that’s more than enough for them to matter.
How much remains to be seen.
Sunday Pod: A Conversation With Venezuelan Refugee, Daniel DiMartino
So what are the Trump administration’s plans for Venezuela? For Cuba? For transforming our hemisphere? IS there a plan?
Join us for a discussion of all this and more with Manhattan Institute Fellow Daniel DiMartino. Born and raised in Venezuela, at 17 Daniel was forced to flee that nation for his current home, America. Now studying for a PhD at Columbia, focusing on immigration issues, there are few who can bring the perspective Daniel can to the question of America’s relationship with Venezuela and indeed, all of Latin America.
Daniel is also the founder of The Dissident Project, “a speakers bureau connecting immigrants who fled tyrannical regimes with Americans—whether they are students, young professionals, or online audiences.” (Note: Look for more of them on upcoming pods. What a fascinating group).
If you weren’t convinced of the destruction communism visits upon nations that take it up, you need to hear Daniel.
The good news: things are changing, and the Trump administration appears long-term committed. But will that last? And will there be a day soon when Americans are booking travel once again to Venezuela’s beaches, mountains, and resorts? Will Americans be munching on arepas in Caracas this time next year?
So click above for the sizzle, or HERE for the full podcast, and join us as we discuss the remaking of the Americas with this week’s guest, Daniel DiMartino.
BULLETS
You thought AOC might be a touch… touched? You were right. (Ketamine? Really?).
New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s new Deputy Director of Public Safety hates police and wants them abolished. What could go wrong?
Funny, seems to us that the George Santos case went quite differently.
AND FINALLY…
So you missed this season’s Geriatric Libtard March (otherwise known as, “No Kings”)?
Which was funded by 500 separate groups with a combined revenue stream of $3 billion?
So did we — by as wide a margin as possible. But don’t worry — here’s a clip from the last one.
You’re welcome.
